In Sickness and in Wealth: dealing with pharmaceuticals and intellectual property at the World Trade Organisation
As with other state functions and responsibilities, the scope of public health services has been subject of continuous changes and reformulations over the years. Nonetheless, despite the realisation that some health problems are global in nature and need to be addressed as such, public health responsibilities still rest mainly with state governments, with the scope of public health services and performance varying widely from state to state. On the other hand, the scope of intellectual property (IP) protection has also varied across states, not least depending on the levels of economic and technological development, but it was considered an issue-area in need of binding international regulation and (upward) harmonisation, as demonstrated by the coming into force of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. The link between international trade, IP protection and public health is one which perhaps cannot be readily made, given that public health responsibilities include a variety of tasks and services, IP protection is a complex issue-area with important repercussions on many other areas, and international trade is an issue-area not generally understood to be concerned with private intellectual property rights (IPRs) or public health issues.
However, as we will see in this paper, the linkage established between IP protection and international trade in the WTO TRIPs agreement has the effect of limiting the space available to governments in dealing with certain public health responsibilities. This is certainly the case for developing and least developed (WTO) members who, already struggling to deliver on the public health front, are required to make substantial changes to their IP laws, especially with regard to pharmaceutical IPRs, in order to comply with the TRIPs provisions.
Indeed, perceiving some of the difficulties in dealing with public health concerns associated with implementing the TRIPs-mandated IP protection for pharmaceuticals, certain state and non-state actors were instrumental in problematising the impact of TRIPs to public health at the WTO in the late 1990s and in securing certain (qualified) flexibilities through the TRIPs amendment process initiated at the WTO Doha played out simultaneously at the domestic and international level, over both rules of IP protection pertaining to pharmaceuticals and norms guiding public health and IP protection more broadly. Importantly, these contestations took place within the trade regime, of which the TRIPs agreement has become a crucial part, whose objective has traditionally been that of achieving trade liberalisation and not of promoting global public health. Hence, we expect these contestations, and their outcome, to have been shaped by the nature of the trade regime which gives primacy to certain discourses, enables some actors while limiting others, and favours certain solutions while foreclosing others. In addition, however one may classify the outcome of these contestations, we expect it to be fluid and intermediate; this is to say that the TRIPs amendment does not necessarily mean that the issues related to IP protection and public health have been settled once and for all, at the WTO or elsewhere.
In this paper, we are concerned primarily with understanding the nature of these contestations, the actors involved therein and their outcome. In other words, we want to understand why and how did the public health issue become important within the trade regime, how the issue was dealt with therein and what kind of solution was found to address it. While doing so, we also aim to highlight the role of non-state actors in shaping the outcome of the contestations over public health at the WTO, alongside state actors, as we maintain that a state-centric approach will obscure somewhat the complex reality we are trying to understand. We start the paper by dealing in the first section with the nature of the linkage established between trade and IP protection in TRIPs and the implications of this linkage in dealing with certain public health concerns. In the second section, we focus on the events that led to the emergence of the IP-public health debate at the WTO and the way this debate was formulated by the different actors involved. In the third and last section we focus on the solution which was agreed on in 2005 and its possible implications on the ability of governments to deal satisfactorily with public health concerns.
I. Establishing linkages between issues and regimes: the health-related aspects of the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
Prior to the TRIPs agreement, the international IP regime consisted of principles, norms and rules regarding IP protection as developed through centuries in response to continuous ideological, political, economic and technological developments. These had resulted in a regime which dealt with IP protection issues in an atomised fashion, with a variety of IP protection forms contained in separate treaties with varying membership and managed largely through the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) (Emmert 1990; Reichman 1995; WIPO 1997) .
1 One main characteristic of this regime was that its members retained enormous sovereign discretion over IP standard-setting, procedures and enforcement; they were free to design their own IP legislation as long as they did not discriminate against foreigners (the national treatment principle) (Anawalt 2003) . As a result, the standards of IP protection varied widely in different countries. 2 This changed with the coming into force of the WTO TRIPs agreement;
now TRIPs 'legislates' beyond national treatment to strong and binding substantive and procedural norms, makes such 'legislation' universal through the trade linkage which ensures that most countries are on board (or will soon be), and provides an institutional structure (the WTO) to ensure compliance with these norms (Murumba 1998 (Subramanian 1990 ). Non-trade-related aspects of IPRs would relate only to intellectual subject matter within the 'intellectual commons', which matter is neither owned nor tradable (May 2000) . This is so because the aim of IPRs, since their inception, has been precisely that of deliberately making knowledge and information scarce in order to enable their commodification and appropriation (May and Sell 2006) . Thus, by granting private rights over intellectual subject matter, IP laws ensure first that intangible goods are commodified and exchanged, and, second, that IPRs themselves can also be traded. However, the social purpose (and justification) of granting and enforcing private IPRs, at least in principle, has been to provide incentives for innovation and creativity that are expected to advance public interests (Boyle 1996; Drahos 1996; Hettinger 1997 ).
Controversies abound with regard to the appropriate level of IP protection which ensures the balance between private and public interests, not to mention whether IP protection is the only or the best way of encouraging and rewarding innovation and creativity. Interestingly, the TRIPs agreement overrides these controversies and establishes that strong and uniform IP protection is essential to free trade, thus asserting that the promotion of trade, not innovation or advancement of public interest, is the primary purpose of enforcing IPRs worldwide (Anawalt 2003; May 2000) . By giving primacy to the trade linkage, it has thus foreclosed other possible linkages. In fact, other linkages had already been made before TRIPs. Trade itself was linked to IP protection since the late 1800s, although then IPRs (particularly patents) were deemed to have a constraining effect on free trade (Penrose 1951; Machlup 1958) . In addition, soon after World War II, inspired by the (US) anti-cartel mood of the time, IPRs were linked to competition, considering strong IP protection as a constraint on competition (Porter 1999; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002 interest of IPRs-holders. However, much to the pharmaceutical industry's dissatisfaction, it does not limit the grounds on which a compulsory licensing can be issued, although it does limit its use, among other things, to the supply of domestic market (Article 31.f) (Sell 2003; Gorlin 1999) . In addition to the above, another layer of protection is afforded to pharmaceuticals through Article 39(3) which mandates the protection of pharmaceutical test data. This is important insofar as such protection may further broaden the scope of patent protection, for instance, by limiting generic producers' access to pharmaceutical data, or by impeding the meaningful exploitation of a compulsory licence by another party, if the patent-holder also benefits from data protection (Pugatch 2004b; von Braun and Pugatch 2005; Dinca 2005 ).
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In view of the above, it becomes clear that the main public health-related aspects of TRIPs provisions, particularly for developing countries, actually relate to access to pharmaceuticals, more precisely, affordable pharmaceuticals. TRIPs restricts access to the latter insofar as, by obligating all members to provide pharmaceutical patents, it allows patent-holders to charge (nearly) monopolistic prices for patented pharmaceuticals and delay the entry of cheap generic versions. 13 Some scholars and pharmaceutical industry representatives have argued that pharmaceutical patent protection is vital to ensure the continuous development of new pharmaceuticals, 14 and
Convention revision process at the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the latter collapsed not least because of it. According to some observers, the controversy over the appropriate scope of compulsory licensing was one of the reasons TRIPs negotiations were initiated at the GATT (rather than WIPO) (UNCTAD and ICSTD 2005) .
12 Pharmaceutical test data refer to data related to clinical trials submitted to health authorities in order to obtain market authorisation for a pharmaceutical product. Access to test data is crucial for third parties in order to produce an effective version of the patented pharmaceutical. Some patent laws contain provision (often referred to as Bolar provisions) which aim to allow generic producers to bring to the market a version of the patented drug as soon as its patent expires. For pro-competitive reasons, exceptions are thus provided which allow generic companies to access data from the originator's file regarding clinical trials and other information to prepare their own dossier (but they will not be permitted to market their drugs before the originator's patent has expired) (see Dinca 2005; von Braun and Pugatch 2005) . 13 For accounts of the impact of patent protection for pharmaceuticals on prices and competition see Scherer 2000 , Grabowski and Vernon 1992 , Matraves 1999 , and Lu and Comanor 1998 . For accounts on how TRIPs provisions impact the pharmaceutical supply system in developing countries see Correa 1997 and that it is not a main barrier to access to health care and treatment (particularly in developing countries), listing the lack of public health infrastructure, international aid and poverty as more important barriers (Attaran and Gillespie-White 2001; EFPIA 2001; Attaran 2004; IFPMA 2006) . We concede that public health responsibilities go well beyond simply ensuring a steady supply of affordable pharmaceuticals and that the lack of a developed public health care infrastructure and widespread poverty affect patients' access to needed treatment. Nevertheless, it is precisely because of these other (more general) barriers that access to cheap and effective pharmaceuticals becomes a more urgent and important issue. This is so because, while in most developed countries pharmaceuticals occupy only around 10-15% of total public health care expenditure (with other health care services responsible for the rest), in most developing and lessdeveloped countries, due to the general shortage of medical facilities, they account for more than 1/3 of public health care budget, and in the majority of cases are paid for privately by patients, if and when within their purchasing power Balasubramaniam 2002 ).
In addition, the argument that strong IP protection now is essential for the development of new pharmaceuticals that can be widely accessed later losses its strength in the light of normative considerations about the primacy of inciting innovation over protecting health. This is so because what is restricted during patent protection for pharmaceuticals is not simply access to an invention while the patent-holder recoups investment, but, importantly, current access to medication essential for human health and, indeed, life (May 2000; Pecoul 2001 ). Innovation in pharmaceuticals should be rewarded but, in view of such moral considerations, more innovative means of rewarding can and must be found which ensure both a steady flow of affordable and effective pharmaceuticals, and enough incentives to invest and innovate in them.
Citizen 2001 for an alternative, significantly lower, estimate) and the unique vulnerability of pharmaceuticals to reverse engineering.
II. The emergence of the IP-public health debate at the WTO As we noted in the previous section, regardless of how it is justified, the TRIPs agreement is primarily about extending and protecting private IP rights and, although flexibilities exist to protect and promote public interests, it is not concerned with these ends per se. Despite this imbalance, criticism and resistance towards TRIPs by those most likely to be negatively affected, net-importers of IPRs (mainly developing and less-developed countries), patients and consumers, was rather muted in the early years, at least within the WTO. Indeed, it was only from the preparations for the WTO Seattle In contrast with TRIPs negotiations where state and certain business actors were the main actors involved, the post-TRIPs period has been characterised by the emergence of new set of state and non-state actors engaged on several contestations over IP issues at the international level. Indeed, just as the trade-IP protection linkage was formulated outside the trade regime in the early 1980s by IP-reliant business actors, the IP-public health linkage was also formulated outside it, by a network of (mainly health) NGOs during the latter part of the 1990s. This linkage can be traced to the severity of the HIV/AIDS pandemic during this period, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and the high price of on-patent HIV/AIDs pharmaceutical cocktails, although the linkage was later expanded to the impact of IP protection for access to pharmaceuticals in general.
NGOs such as the Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) and Health Action
International (HAI) got first involved in these issues in the mid 1990s, and were soon joined by an array of other NGOs including, most importantly, two heavyweight, nonpartisan international NGOs, the Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) and Oxfam (Sell and Prakash 2004; Matthews 2006 What these developments demonstrate is that public health concerns commanded wide enough recognition at the international level for the IP-public health linkage propagated by the NGOs network to be established and pursued further within the trade regime. In addition, efforts by the research-based pharmaceutical industry to ensure a 'proper' implementation of the TRIPs agreement were crucial in perhaps inadvertently raising the profile of the IP-public health issue. The same business actors that had been instrumental in attaining the TRIPs agreement at the WTO during the Uruguay Round continued to be involved with TRIPs implementation, with the research-based pharmaceutical business actors being particularly engaged in ensuring a rigorous and timely implementation of TRIPs, especially in the developing countries (Matthews 2002; Sell 2003; Pugatch 2004a) . Continuing with the discourse of strong IP protection as prerequisite for free and fair trade, the zeal of (pharmaceutical) business actors and of their respective governments found expression through two channels within the trade regime: its surveillance and dispute settlement mechanisms. This continuing role of business actors on the IPRs-trade linkage can be explained by the fact that the two major trade regime members, the EU and the US, are both too aware of the need to maintain and promote IP-reliant industries and depend heavily on the latter to provide information on the status of TRIPs implementation and IPRs infringements in other countries (Sell 1999; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) .
With regard to the surveillance mechanism, early work at the WTO TRIPs Council, (Musungu and Oh, 2006) .
In any case, implementation depends as much on 'well-drafted' laws as it does on their enforcement. Indeed, the need to attain (almost) global enforcement of IPRs was one of the reasons for bringing IP protection within the trade regime. It is in this respect that ensuring enforcement of TRIPs provisions through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism becomes important, although the latter was not designed with complex IP protection and enforcement issues in mind (Reichman 1997; Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld 1997) . Although business actors cannot officially be part of WTO disputes, ultimately, it is infringement of their IPRs that would prompt governments to bring cases of inadequate IP protection in other countries before WTO dispute settlement panels (May 2000) . This is not to say that governments will bring a case to the WTO each time complaints are made by business actors, but that when a TRIPs complaint is brought at 19 This was highlighted to the authors during interviews with some developing countries' representatives in Geneva in February and July 2006.
20 TRIPs plus provisions may refer to both obligations that are of a higher standard than those specified in TRIPs and introduction of other obligations which are missing or ambiguous in the TRIPs text. Some of these are extending patents and copyright to new kinds of subject matter; eliminating or narrowing permitted exceptions including those still provided in US and European IPR laws; extending protection terms; introducing new TRIPS-mandated IPR rules earlier than the transition periods allowed by TRIPS; and ratifying new WIPO treaties containing TRIPS plus measures (see Drahos 2002) .
the WTO, the relevant government positions are based on close consultations with the affected business who, in turn, are both keen and well-placed to provide specialist knowledge and expertise on the IP issues being deliberated (Matthews 2002 21 Governments, particularly those of the US and the EU who are capable of affording a WTO dispute case, will however not bring any complaint by affected industries to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Bilateral consultations usually take place beforehand and, if these are unsuccessful, a case might be filed at the WTO, taking in consideration also wider concerns and international diplomacy imperatives (see Matthews 2002) . For the US, this remains the case although the USTR was given more independence from the Presidential Office in several trade amendment acts during the 1980s precisely so as not to allow trade issues to become subjected to other political concerns (see Bello and Holmer 1988 ) . In the EU case, the difficulty of acting on IPRs infringements abroad is compounded by the fact that the EC enjoys joint competency with all Community Members (see European Court Opinion 61994V0001, 1994, emphasis added).
22 India did, in fact, allow mailbox applications, but there was no appropriate legislation to make receipts of such applications a legal requirement (Matthews 2002; Reichman 1998) . Mailbox provisions, contained in TRIPs Article 70, intend to freeze the novelty requirement for the granting of pharmaceutical patents for products which were filed after the TRIPs agreement came into force (1995), but which would not benefit from patent protection in countries where this protection is not available until a later date if the mailbox mechanism is not provided. In addition to providing for mailbox application, the TRIPs agreement also obliges states that do not need to comply with TRIPs until a latter date to provide market exclusivity (of 5 years) for products for which a mailbox application is made and which has obtained marketing approval in another country. (Gorlin 1999; Gervais 2003) .
research-based pharmaceutical industry, which went to great lengths to organise internationally, provide information and expertise during the dispute and enrol the support of both the US and the EU, in order to ensure that its IPRs were fully protected (Matthews 2002 ).
Likewise, both the Argentine and Brazilian case were also brought on complaints by the (US) pharmaceutical industry, on the failure of the Argentine patent law to provide TRIPs-mandated protection as related to exclusive marketing rights and protection of pharmaceutical test data (amongst other issues added in 2000), and on the local working requirements and parallel import provisions retained in Brazil's patent law (Sell 2003; Shanker 2002) . 23 The The removal of cases from the WTO settlement mechanism to bilateral consultations and solutions raises some important questions about the power dynamics involved in such consultations and whether solutions agreed therein are indeed TRIPs-compliant. In addition, the benefits of the WTO settlement mechanism for developing countries rest partly in it providing a means that would alleviate bilateral pressure put on them by the major regime members (Sell 1995; Dunoff 1999) . However, at least as regards IP protection, bilateral pressure has not been reduced significantly after TRIPs came into force in 1995. Amongst other countries, Brazil, India and Argentina have often been identified as the 'worst appropriators' of pharmaceutical inventions by the industry and have made regular entries at the USTR Special 301 'priority' or 'priority watch' lists 23 Brazil has one of the most successful HIV/AIDS programmes in the developing world which provides free treatment to its patients; this is largely achieved through the threat of using compulsory licensing in order to negotiate deep cuts in antiretroviral medications with the proprietary pharmaceutical companies, or allowing parallel importation of such pharmaceuticals from other countries. The case brought against Brazil related to provisions in its patent law which allowed compulsory licensing in case of failure of the manufacturer to work its patent in Brazil, as well as provisions related to parallel importing. The case was withdrawn not least because of the success Brazil had attained in its HIV/AIDS programme through these measures, in addition to Brazil challenging the US version of working requirement in its patent law (Shanker 2002; Drahos 2004 ).
(based largely on industry's information and data), as well as subjected to trade sanctions, for 'inadequate' IP protection before, during and after TRIPs negotiations (Sell 1995; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002) . 24 In addition to this relentless multilateral and bilateral pressure to 'improve' IP protection for pharmaceuticals, some developing countries have also seen their margins of TRIPs-afforded flexibility narrow through bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), involving the US or the EU, in which the IP-trade linkage is pursued further via inserting certain 'TRIPs plus' provisions of interest to the pharmaceutical industry (amongst others), in exchange for access to the lucrative markets of these countries (Drahos 2001; . 25 Overall, whether within or without the WTO, these attempts by the pharmaceutical industry and some major industrialised countries demonstrate their determination to both ensure an implementation of TRIPs that concurs with their interests and to achieve concrete results in areas dealt with ambiguously or not covered by TRIPs.
It was hence within this context that the IP-public health linkage propagated by the NGOs network initially received more than a sympathetic nod by the developing countries. As awareness grew about the impact of strong IP protection for pharmaceuticals from 1999 onwards, more NGOs, international institutions (the World Bank, UNCTAD and UNDP) and academics were getting involved in the debate of finding the right balance between protecting IPRs and ensuring access to medicines (Drahos 2004; Sell and Prakash 2005; Matthews 2006 Once a country is identified as a priority country, the USTR must initiate an investigation within 30 days, and determine the actionability of foreign activity and devise a policy response within six months from the start of the investigations. In addition to the priority list, the USTR also compiles annually a "priority watch" list, where countries with serious IP protection shortfalls but not target of deadlined negotiations are ranked (see Ryan 1998; Ostry 2002; Sell 2003) . 25 Such as provisions related to compulsory licensing, scope of patent protection, test data protection, supplementary protection certificates etc. One example of such agreements is that between the US and Jordan in 2000, wherein, amongst other things, the grounds of exclusion from patentability (TRIPs Article 27) are narrowed down, the compulsory licensing provisions confine the its use to specific cases, and an obligation to provide an extension of patent term to compensate patent owners for regulatory delays in being able to exploit the patent (see Drahos 2001 (Ostergard, 1999; Kongolo, 2001) over IP protection runs directly against the restrictive interpretation given to the respective provisions until then. Indeed, the language adopted was opposed by some developed countries, particularly the US, for fear that such language would weaken the commitment to patent protection and TRIPs obligations in general. 27 However, such opposition was dampened somehow by the anthrax scare in the US during the same time, when the US government was seriously contemplating the use of compulsory licensing in order to cope with a potential public health crisis (Correa 2002; Sell 2005 Finally, as regards the trade regime, the Doha Declaration came at a time when the major WTO members were pushing hard for the inclusion of new negotiation issues of interest to them in a new Round which, following the increasingly active involvement of the developing countries within the trade regime in the late 1990s, had to be given a certain development dimension to become acceptable to all (Panagariya 2002).
III. Amending the TRIPs Agreement
The Doha Declaration impacted the international IPRs discourse in several ways:
firstly, by establishing the primacy of public health concerns over IP protection;
secondly, by opening up possibilities for other IP linkages to be developed elsewhere; 28 and, thirdly, by providing an important political and legal instrument in TRIPs interpretation and implementation, as well as in disputes involving IP-related public health measures, as and when these arise. 29 Although it is not a binding instrument, its significance rests on it providing an alterative interpretation of TRIPs, offering an important, albeit isolated, indicator of what norms should take precedence within the regime. Nevertheless, because it relates to flexibilities already contained in TRIPs with regard to public health, its significance should not be overestimated either. This is to say that it does not seriously threaten the primacy of IP protection as a prerequisite for free and fair trade established by TRIPs overall. As we will see, even with regard to public health issues, although pressure and fear of retaliatory actions when using measures to deal with health crisis have subsided, they have not been eliminated.
That IP protection has remained closely linked to trade imperatives is also evident in the fact that, even as the Doha Declaration was being negotiated, both the US and the There has never been a time when compulsory licensing has not been controversial in international IP deliberations, and work on the paragraph 6 proved no exception. As far as research-based pharmaceutical companies were concerned, work on paragraph 6 could result in a mechanism which would be used to legitimise the granting of compulsory licences on all sorts of pharmaceuticals to deal with public health issues by a large number of countries that would claim they lacked manufacturing capacities for the pharmaceutical product in question. 31 In order to counter this significant 30 Amongst developing countries, only a handful have some innovative capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector (that is, capable of manufacturing a patented pharmaceutical through reverse engineering, namely Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, China and Korea) and around 60 of them have no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities at all , mostly less-developed countries where the incidence of disease and lack of health facilities is also likely to be problematic. 36 The legal status of the Chairman Statement remains unclear, but at the very least it represents an interpretative instrument for the 2003 solution (Baker 2003) . With regard to countries that opted-out, these include all the developed countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). Additionally, ten countries expecting to access to the EU agreed to use the system as importers only in cases of national or other extreme cases or urgency, upon which accession they would opt-out completely. although not generally proscribing compulsory licensing for health purposes, are expected to limit the availability of affordable generic pharmaceuticals (Abbott 2004; Morin 2006) . The combined effect of these developments within and without the WTO on the ability of developing countries' governments to deal with public health concerns is yet to unfold.
IV. Conclusions
It was the differences on IP protection afforded to private rightholders across national boundaries, and not the astounding differences in public health, that were deemed urgent enough to warrant binding commitments at the global level. With the establishment of the WTO TRIPs agreement, the discourse of strong, harmonised global IP protection as a prerequisite for free trade has superseded all other concerns, including those related to public health. The post-TRIPs period has seen this discourse being contested in various levels, but in this paper we have focused specifically on contestation amongst state and non-state actors taking place within the trade regime on IP protection and public health issues. We have noted that the Doha Declaration in 2001 was a victory in terms of explicitly placing public health concerns over private IP protection, but whether this discourse has replaced that established by TRIPs remains uncertain. This is so because, as we have noted, the major trade regime members have continued to give primacy to IP protection as an international trade and competitiveness issue, a formulation which has continued to inform both their multilateral and bilateral trade strategies.
Indeed, following the contestations with regard to compulsory licensing at the WTO, we noted that all efforts were made by these members and the pharmaceutical industry to ensure that the 'legitimate' property protected by TRIPs was not appropriated 'arbitrarily', even for public health purposes, by other members of the regime. For this reason, the 2003 Decision, and the ensuing 2005 amendment, represents a solution which is laden with safeguards aimed at preserving the rights of patent-holders, rather than at providing flexibilities to deal with public health concerns. While the issue of compulsory licensing and public health in general may appear to have been settled at the WTO, at least for the moment, we have noted that other developments have continued to further increase IP protection standards worldwide, including those pertaining to pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, these recent developments have also set in motion another set of contestations, whose outcomes in terms of improving global public health remain to be seen.
